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Privacy vs. Progress: Research 
Exceptionalism Is Bad Medicine  
Suzanne M. Rivera† 
Abstract 
Attitudes about privacy are changing in non-research settings, but 
these attitudinal shifts do not seem to be affecting the way regulators 
and ethicists think about the need to protect people from the risks of 
harm resulting from use of personal information in research studies (so-
called “informational risks”). Increasingly, people routinely share 
personal information (including health information) online. And yet, a 
proposal has been made to restrict further the use of existing data, such 
as electronic medical records, for purposes of scientific research, even 
when personal identifiers have been removed. The disproportionate focus 
on “informational” risks in research is a form of research exceptionalism. 
This practice of treating research risks with greater caution than we 
treat other risks encountered in daily life is a legacy of past research 
abuses. Although understandable in historical context, this 
exceptionalism is harmful when it unreasonably interferes with scientific 
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Introduction 
Privacy is not dead. But it does not look anything like your great-
grandmother’s privacy. In 1890 Samuel Warren and (the future Supreme 
Court Justice) Louis Brandeis wrote a seminal piece in the Harvard Law 
Review called “The Right to Privacy.”1 In it they argued that 
“[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in 
the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.’”2 In their day, the 
idea of a still photograph ending up in a newspaper felt like a dangerous 
threat to civilized society. Imagine what they would think of YouTube.  
Attitudes change. Eventually, people in the United States (and 
around the world) adjusted to a new paradigm for journalistic inquiry 
that included still photography –an advance that, in hindsight, improved 
reporting by providing more specific information to readers. This was 
followed by video journalism and then internet journalism, each bringing 
about a shift in consumers’ expectations about where precisely the 
camera would go and how the images would be delivered. But, in 1890, 
as people were still getting used to the newly widespread availability of 
cameras, a kind of privacy panic took hold.3 
When it comes to the (re)use of existing records and data for re-
search today, some privacy advocates are caught up in a similar panic. 
Worried about snooping by unscrupulous researchers or malevolent 
third-parties, they portray the secondary use of information, such as that 
contained in electronic medical records (EMR), as “dataveillance.”4 
Their fear is that re-using existing data for research purposes (including 
the kinds of public information that are “scraped” from Twitter feeds or 
Facebook posts) will cause harm to study subjects. And their fear 
remains even when the data are de-identified because of the possibility of 
re-identification and a worry that such information could be used in a 
harmful way (such as discrimination) or used to develop commercial 
products for which the subjects receive no compensation.5  
 
1. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 
193 (1890). 
2. Id. at 195. 
3. Amitai Etzioni, The Myth of Privacy Invasion, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(September 10, 2001), http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0910/p9s1-
coop.html. 
4. DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 
47 (1994). 
5. Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, “Scrapers” Dig Deep for Data on Web, 
WALL ST. J. (October 11, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870335850457554438128811
7888.html. 
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Others, however, are beginning to recognize that the benefits of 
gathering and analyzing such data outweigh the real and perceived risks 
to privacy. Some scientists and research advocates argue that data 
sources such as EMR and health information posted via the internet are 
invaluable tools for generation of important new scientific knowledge.6 
Many beneficial research studies can be done by data analysis without 
ever interacting with a human subject, and much of the information in 
question already is publicly available.7 One example of the social value of 
such endeavors is that flu outbreaks can now be predicted more quickly 
and cost effectively by analysis of Twitter feeds8 or Google search terms9 
than by review of hospital charts. This approach to public health 
monitoring by analysis of social media data sometimes is called 
“infodemiology.”10  
We are at a crossroads. Although privacy as a concept still exists, 
the way we treat information about ourselves is in flux. New technolo-
gies make large-scale sharing of information both easy and cost-effective. 
What previously was considered private is now routinely made public via 
blogs, twitter feeds, YouTube videos, and Facebook status updates. The 
question I will address in this paper is: since we share information more 
freely now than ever before in most aspects of everyday life, why not 
also do so in the pursuit of science? 
 
6. See Damon Centola, Social Media as a Tool in Medicine: Social Media and 
the Science of Health Behavior, 127 CIRCULATION: J. AM. HEART ASS’N 
2135 (2013); Peter Jensen et al., Mining Electronic Health Records: 
Towards Better Research Applications and Clinical Care, 13 NATURE 
REVIEWS: GENETICS 395 (2012). 
7. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 160.3(v) (2013); 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2013) (defining 
“publicly available” as “[i]nformation that is generally accessible to the 
interested public in any form and, therefore, not subject to the [Export 
Administration Regulations]”); FTC Privacy of Consumer Financial 
Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(p) (2013); OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., 
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 44 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf. 
8. Using Twitter to Track the Flu: Researchers Find a Better Way to Screen 
the Tweets, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/01/130124163238.htm. 
9. Gunther Eysenbach, Infodemiology: Tracking Flu-related Searches on the 
Web for Syndromic Surveillance, in AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 
SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 244, 244 (2006). 
10. Gunther Eysenbach, Infodemiology and Infoveillance: Framework for an 
Emerging Set of Public Health Informatics Methods to Analyze Search, 
Communication, and Publication Behavior on the Internet, J. MED. 
INTERNET RES. (2009), http://www.jmir.org/2009/1/e11/. 
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I. Changing Attitudes about Privacy 
Numerous scholars have demonstrated that attitudes about privacy 
are changing.11 We are growing accustomed to sharing information about 
ourselves that we used to think of as personal. One catalyst for this shift 
is the Internet, which facilitates broad electronic self-disclosure by users 
via venues such as RSS feeds, listservs, chat rooms, and blogs. Not all 
the information circulating in virtual space is health-related, but many 
people do post their sonograms on Facebook, tweet about their colonos-
copies, and upload their medical histories to health advocacy share sites 
like PatientsLikeMe (PLM),12 an online patient community designed to 
promote health-related information sharing. Online health networks like 
PLM are “revolutionizing the way patients share their health 
information and personal experiences, learn about health conditions, add 
to the body of scientific data, and socialize with other patients.”13  
We share our information in virtual space because it makes us happy 
or because we are willing to trade privacy for a service we enjoy or from 
which we derive benefit. Numerous electronic applications are available 
now for free or at a modest price, which, in exchange for certain personal 
information, can deliver services and entertainment. For example, you 
can have real-time traffic updates texted to your smart phone but only if 
you allow the provider to track your exact location. The permission to 
allow geographical surveillance, which in other contexts might seem like 
an invasion of privacy, is given willingly in exchange for a perceived 
benefit. Similar applications require personal health information to 
monitor menstrual cycles and predict ovulation, to count calories, and to 
aid with smoking cessation. When one considers the scale14 of the 
 
11. Chris Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults 
When It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies? 3 (Apr. 14 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864. See Wen-ying Sylvia Chou et al., 
Social Media in the United States: Implications for Health Communication, 
J. MED. INTERNET RES. (2009), http://www.jmir.org/2009/4/e48/; Deborah 
M. Moscardelli & Richard Devine, Adolescents’ Concern for Privacy When 
Using the Internet: An Empirical Analysis of Predictors and Relationships 
with Privacy-Protecting Behaviors, 35 FAM. AND CONSUMER SCI. RES. J. 
232, 234 (2007). 
12. Jeana H. Frost & Michael P. Massagli, Social Uses of Personal Health 
Information Within PatientsLikeMe, an Online Patient Community: What 
Can Happen When Patients Have Access to One Another’s Data, J. MED. 
INTERNET RES. (2008), http://www.jmir.org/2008/3/e15/. 
13. Patricia Sanchez Abril & Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a Techno-Social 
World: A Cyber-Patient’s Bill of Rights, 6 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 244, 245 (2008). 
14. Estimates are that Facebook alone has over one billion users worldwide. 
See Vindu Goel, Facebook’s Stock Soars Amid Rosy Growth Expectations, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013, 5:32 PM), 
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voluntary information sharing that takes place every day online, there is 
no disputing that perceptions are changing about the nature of privacy 
itself.  
These changes should cause us to question whether our fears about 
research uses of data are out of step with the way people live today. 
While attitudes about sharing personal data have been evolving in the 
Internet age, hesitation about using those data for research purposes 
persists. Changing societal attitudes about privacy in non-research 
environments do not appear to inform how regulators think about 
appropriate protections from so-called informational risks in research. 
This is reflected in the way research activities are governed. The U.S. 
regulations pertaining to protection of research subjects15 still treat 
privacy like a static object frozen in a twentieth century, analog world. 
And the rules may soon become even more restrictive. Recent proposals 
put forth by the Office for Human Research Protections,16 the federal 
entity responsible for oversight of federally-funded human research 
projects, would make it harder for scholars working on bona fide studies 
to use de-identified data sets. The proposal under consideration would 
ban the use of de-identified study data unless researchers obtain the 
informed consent of the people from whom the data originally were 
derived. Practically speaking, this would render impossible the currently 
accepted practice of sharing or re-using existing study data as long as 
the personal identifiers have been stripped to protect the identities of the 
subjects. 
Since people routinely disclose information about themselves outside 
of research in ways that can be shared, copied, and reused (even for 
commercial purposes), it is worth considering whether our attitudes 
about the (re)use of data in a research context also ought to change. 
II. The Paradox of Research Exceptionalism  
For several reasons, we treat research differently than the other ac-
tivities of life. We apply greater caution to oversight of research studies 
than we do with dangerous or socially stigmatizing occupations, risky 
recreational activities, or even the hazards of everyday living routinely 




15. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2012). See also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects (“Common Rule”), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html 
[hereinafter Common Rule]. 
16. See generally Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing 
Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and 
Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512 (July 26, 2011) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56, 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164). 
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Wilson and Hunter, human research is “much more stringently regulated 
than many other non-research activities that appear to be at least as 
risky.”17 Numerous other scholars also have observed this phenomenon of 
treating research risks with greater caution than we treat other risks 
encountered in daily life and, in bioethics circles, it is referred to as 
research exceptionalism.18  
One of the principal reasons for research exceptionalism is an unde-
niable and tragic history of past research abuses.19 Without reviewing 
here the shameful catalogue of unethical studies conducted in the U.S.,20 
it should suffice to say that the current regulatory environment is an 
understandable response to bad behavior. In addition, some ethicists 
have argued that—even without the context of past abuses –research is, 
in fact, different from regular, everyday life and deserves to be treated 
with greater caution.21 But it is not at all clear that the difference in 
context between research and other non-research activities of life affects 
or makes more relevant the fundamental ethical principles of respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice.22 
Research exceptionalism has paradoxical negative consequences. Alt-
hough it seeks to protect the subjects (and potential subjects) of 
research, exceptionalism results in a peculiar kind of paternalism that 
infringes on their individual liberties. Autonomy (the core of “respect for 
persons”) is widely considered the foundational principle of human 
research ethics. But paternalistic protectionism actually infringes on 
autonomy by presuming to know what is best for others and by limiting 
their choices to reduce risks. In other words, fear about the possibility of 
harm results in restrictions on research that prevent people from becom-
ing involved in studies they might very well support. 
This paradox illuminates a subtle distinction between the narrow 
concept of autonomy and the broader principle of “respect for persons,” 
 
17. James Wilson & David Hunter, Research Exceptionalism, 10 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 45, 45 (2010). 
18. See Sally Bean, Beyond Research Exceptionalism: A Call for Process 
Redesign, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 58, 59 (2010); see also Sven Ove Hansson, 
Reversing “Research Exceptionalism,” 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 66, 66 (2010). 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1354 (1966) (discussing numerous “unethical or questionable” studies 
on humans during a ten-year period following the end of World War II); 
JONATHAN MORENO, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS 
(1999). 
21. See Wilson & Hunter, supra note 17. 
22. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192-97 (April 18, 
1979) [hereinafter Belmont Report]. 
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articulated in the enduringly influential Belmont Report,23 written in 
1979 by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Although people often use the 
idea of autonomy interchangeably with Belmont’s “Respect for Persons” 
principle, it is important to note they are not, in fact, synonymous.24 
Respect includes the honoring of a person’s expressed autonomy. But a 
researcher ostensibly can respect a person even if the person cannot (e.g. 
by virtue of incapacity) or does not choose to assert free will. Indeed, 
Belmont admonishes that researchers must increase protections for those 
subjects who are least able to assert autonomy. However, that respectful 
intention can quickly become paternalistic when applied in the form of 
unsolicited protection. In the language of Belmont, “Some persons are in 
need of extensive protection, even to the point of excluding them from 
activities which may harm them. . . .” 25 
With regard to privacy, research exceptionalism takes the form of 
restrictions or prohibitions against research use of any data or materials 
that could potentially stigmatize the subjects. But the risk of stigma is 
too blunt an instrument by which to measure the likelihood or magni-
tude of the potential for harm. Since attitudes about privacy outside of 
research are evolving, in the sense that the boundaries between what is 
public and what is private are becoming more fluid, research regulation 
around the use of data should evolve, too.  
It is not logical to regulate the secondary use of existing research 
data more strictly than iPod apps or Twitter feeds when millions of 
people share their personal information for non-research purposes every 
day. Treating research differently is harmful to public health because it 
slows progress on solving important problems. In this regard, our focus 
on privacy protection has become a hindrance to scientific progress, 
which cannot be justified on ethical grounds. We fuss about it dispropor-
tionately. And it is not the only value to be considered when 
determining whether and how to use health-related information for 
research.  
III. Historical Roots of (Privacy) Protections in 
Research 
Human research is as old as the medical profession itself. Some point 
to a nutritional experiment on prisoners described in the Bible’s Book of 
 
23. Id. 
24. M. Therese Lysaught, Respect: Or, How Respect for Persons Became 
Respect for Autonomy, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 665, 675 (2004). 
25. Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. at 23,193. 
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Daniel as the first documented human clinical trial.26 Despite the fact 
that physicians and scientists have been studying human subjects since 
at least as early as Hippocrates, documented concerns about the ethics of 
using humans in research are only perhaps a few hundred years old. 
According to Jonathan Moreno, the first efforts to limit research on 
humans did not occur until the 1890s, when antivivisectionists began 
calling for laws to protect institutionalized children from being used in 
medical experiments for vaccine development in the U.S. and in Eu-
rope.27 
Violation of privacy is widely considered one of the anticipated risks 
of human research. The notion that privacy violations or breaches of 
confidentiality could represent a risk of harm to research subjects made 
its international debut in the World Medical Association’s Declaration of 
Helsinki (first adopted in 1964 and revised eight times, most recently in 
2008), which says, “Every precaution must be taken to protect the 
privacy of research subjects and the confidentiality of their personal 
information and to minimize the impact of the study on their physical, 
mental and social integrity.”28 This concept was codified in U.S. regula-
tions in 1981 with the promulgation of the Common Rule,29 which 
requires scientists and ethics committees, called Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs), to consider potential invasions of privacy and breaches of 
confidentiality as risks of research participation worthy of consideration, 
mitigation, and disclosure. 
Privacy is strongly related to autonomy, a core principle of bioeth-
ics.30 Autonomy also is an important concept in human research ethics.31 
In 1974 the U.S. Congress formed a commission to develop national 
standards for human research conducted with public funds.32 The 
 
26. E.g., Duncan Neuhauser & Mireya Diaz, Daniel: Using the Bible to Teach 
Quality Improvement Methods, 13 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 153, 
153 (2004). 
27. Jonathan D. Moreno, Goodbye to All That: The End of Moderate 
Protectionism in Human Subjects Research, 31 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9, 10 
(2001). 
28. WORLD MED. ASS’N, WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF 
HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
SUBJECTS 3 (1964), available at 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.pdf. 
29. See Common Rule, supra note 15. 
30. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 294 (5th ed. 2001). 
31. Id. at 57. 
32. On July 12, 1974, the National Research Act (Pub. L. 93-348) was signed 
into law, thereby creating the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
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commission issued its findings, known as The Belmont Report, in 1979.33 
The report articulated three fundamental principles for protection of 
human research subjects: respect for persons (often used interchangeably 
with autonomy), beneficence, and justice.34 In a research context, the 
principle of respect for persons means people should be “treated as 
autonomous agents” in the sense that we honor the individual’s right to 
self-determination.35 Privacy and autonomy are conceptually inextricable 
in the sense that the individual is believed to be entitled to control 
him/herself, including information about him/herself. Autonomy thus 
extends beyond the corporeal body and outward, into the sphere of 
reputation. Therefore, a violation of privacy can be seen as a harm to 
autonomy (even if only a theoretical, dignitary harm).36  
People who work in the field of human research ethics are oriented 
to think primarily about protection from potential harms. This orienta-
tion is understandable, because the bioethics subspecialty of applied 
research ethics was born out of a response to scandalous research 
violations resulting in harms to human health, welfare, and dignity—all 
committed in the name of science. Perhaps the most notorious of these 
was the Public Health Service-supported “Tuskegee Study of Untreated 
Syphilis in the Negro Male,”37 but it was by no means an isolated 
incident.38  
The historical imperatives that created our modern research ethics 
tradition shaped a profession that defaults toward mistrust of investiga-
tors and fear of injury or other harms to subjects. Previous abuses 
inform our thinking about what can go wrong in research and influence 
the development of rules to prevent recurrences. The journalistic 
investigation by Rebecca Skloot into the circumstances surrounding the 
unauthorized creation and use of the HeLa cell line39 showed what can 
happen to the public’s trust in science and scientists when people feel 
deceived, violated, and exploited. In short, because research abuses have 
occurred in the past, we have reason to assume they will again in the 
future, and we tend to approach the evaluation of potential research 
 
33. Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192-97 (April 18, 1979). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Ruth Macklin, Dignity is a Useless Concept, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 1419, 1419 
(2003). 
37. U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee , CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http:///www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm 
(last updated Sept. 24, 2013) (acknowledging the U.S. Public Health 
Service’s intentional failure to treat hundreds of black men for syphilis as 
part of a study conducted from 1932 to 1972). 
38. See Beecher, supra note 20, at 1354. 
39. See generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 
(2010).  
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through the lens of worry—in some cases too much worry. This has 
resulted in regulations that, unfortunately, have not kept pace with 
advances in science.  
This tendency toward protectionism has been amplified by co-
morbid fears about new technologies, such as EMR, cloud-based digital 
storage media, and social networking websites, all of which often are 
seen—by research regulators and privacy advocates –as potential 
instruments of harm from both inadvertent disclosures and deliberate 
attacks.40 Although these fears of new technology may be generational, 
they are no less real.41 The age cohort making all the legal and regulato-
ry decisions may feel a little queasy about online avatars giving informed 
consent in SecondLife42 and real-time tweets from hospital operating 
rooms, but, increasingly, the age cohort of potential research subjects 
takes for granted the ubiquitous connectivity made possible by these 
technologies.  
With specific regard to secondary uses of EMR data for research, the 
emphasis on privacy protection is a matter of great consternation. 
Concerns have been raised about the need to protect individual privacy 
rights in research because electronic storage and transmission of large 
data sets could be vulnerable to hacking. Put plainly, even encrypted 
laptops and password-protected databases somehow feel less secure than 
the metal filing cabinets and bicycle couriers of yore. Of course, electron-
ic file sharing can make a breach of research data potentially more 
damaging than the theft of a file cabinet; however, the fear that malevo-
lent uses of existing data are more likely in cyberspace is unfounded. We 
already have rules against misuse of protected health information for 
research purposes,43 and there is no evidence to suggest these rules are 
violated any more than, say, the laws that would prevent a scientist 
from intentionally killing a research subject or stealing money from a 
laboratory account.44 I would argue that our electronic measures for 
EMR security provide greater protection (through, for example, file 
encryption and passwords) and audit trails than the paper folders that 
 
40. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1771 (2010); Arvind 
Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and Security: Myths and Fallacies 
of “Personally Identifiable Information,” 53 COMMS. OF THE ASS’N. FOR 
COMPUTING MACHINERY 24, 24 (2010). 
41. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 11, at 3. 
42. SecondLife is “a 3D world where everyone you see is a real person and 
every place you visit is built by people just like you.” SECONDLIFE, 
http://www.secondlife.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
43. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. 
pts. 160, 164 (2013). 
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used to contain medical records. However, like the person who puts her 
life at greater risk behind the wheel of a car every day but despairs at 
the thought of an annual airplane flight, we fear that with which we are 
less familiar. And even if the material harms of a privacy breach never 
do come to fruition, the recent flap about the National Security Agency’s 
surveillance of civilian emails and phone calls45 has fueled concerns that 
Big Government (or, in the case of EMR data, Big Pharma) might see 
something about us we would prefer to keep private.  
We place a great deal of importance on privacy in this country, not 
only because it is a fundamental right in the U.S.,46 but because it 
traditionally has been an aspect of human dignity that we value. And 
because privacy is linked closely with autonomy, violations of privacy 
are thought to be synonymous or at least morally equivalent to, viola-
tions of personal autonomy. In the realm of research, however, this 
deference to personal autonomy has failed to keep pace with technologi-
cal and social changes, including the evolution in attitudes about 
privacy. 
IV. Privacy and Uses of Health Information 
The health information contained in EMR is extremely valuable for 
clinical trials, discovery research, and public health studies, including 
post-marketing surveillance. 47 Analyzing this kind of information is such 
an efficient way to answer scientific questions that some scholars argue 
EMR data ought to be treated as a public resource.48 Further, it has 
been suggested that scientific analyses of such data, even without 
 
45. Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Often Broke Rules on Privacy, Audit Shows, N.Y. 
TIMES (August 16, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2013/08/16/us/nsa-often-broke-rules-on-privacy-audit-shows.html. 
46. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 507, 510 (1967) (holding that the 
FBI’s secretly recording a payphone conversation constituted an 
unreasonable search since the defendant had a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” protected under the Fourth Amendment); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that Connecticut’s 
criminalization of contraception violated individuals’ right to privacy in 
their marital relationships).  
47. Tjeerd-Pieter van Staa et al., Pragmatic Randomised Trials Using Routine 
Electronic Health Records: Putting Them to the Test, BRIT. MED. J., Feb. 
7, 2012, at 1. See also Isaac S. Kohane, Using Electronic Health Records to 
Drive Discovery in Disease Genomics, 12 NATURE REVS GENETICS 417 
(2011); Sebastian Schneeweiss, Developments in Post-Marketing 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, 82 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 143 (2007).  
48. Isaac S. Kohane & Russ B. Altman, Health-Information Altruists — A 
Potentially Critical Resource, 354 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2074, 2074 (2005). 
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consent, might be considered a “fair use,” along the lines of copyright 
laws that allow for exceptions to traditional protections in circumstances 
considered meritorious.49  
The stakes are sufficiently high that alternatives to the traditional 
privacy paradigm must be considered. As Lawrence Gostin has argued, 
“[A] complex modern society cannot elevate each person’s interest in 
privacy above other important societal interests” like “access to 
healthcare, more equitable distribution of services to vulnerable popula-
tions, and higher quality, better research.”50  
The ethical principle of beneficence compels us to maximize the val-
ue of existing clinical data—whether de-identified or used in an 
identifiable form with IRB permission and all the applicable require-
ments to preserve confidentiality –for everyone’s benefit. According to 
Eric Lander, founder of the Harvard MIT Broad Institute, “If we are 
going to solve cancer, it is going to take a movement of tens of thou-
sands, or hundreds of thousands, of patients willing to contribute 
information from their cancer genomes toward a common good.”51  
In research, we require voluminous informed consent documents be-
fore volunteers can participate in studies.52 We also require review by an 
independent committee when researchers want to collect identifiable 
information that could be potentially stigmatizing to subjects.53 And the 
independent committees that evaluate proposed research studies are 
expected to pay special attention to justifications for collection of genetic 
information because of concerns that it could be used to discriminate in 
health insurance, employment, citizenship, and other legal matters.54 
However, outside of a research context, we increasingly are willing to 
share information about our health, or even our DNA, for non-scientific 
purposes.  
23andMe is a company that will, for $99, map your personal ge-
nome.55 In addition to yielding information about heritable diseases 
 
49. Jessica Berg, A “Fair Use” Exception for Public Health Uses of Medical 
Information?, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 13 (2013). 
50. Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 
514-15 (1995). 
51. Carl Zimmer, A Family Consents to a Medical Gift, 62 Years Later, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/science/after-
decades-of-research-henrietta-lacks-family-is-asked-for-consent.html. 
52. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (2005). 
53. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(2)(i)–(ii) (2005). 
54. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, GUIDANCE ON THE 
GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INVESTIGATORS AND INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (2009), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/gina.html. 
55. 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
Privacy vs. Progress: Research Exceptionalism Is Bad Medicine 
61 
(which is, itself, a matter of some controversy),56 the service provides an 
ancestry analysis that allows customers to “[f]ind out if [they] share an 
ancestor with famous figures such as Marie Antoinette and Thomas 
Jefferson.”57 Similarly, it is now possible to commission so-called “genetic 
art,” the likes of which you can purchase from a company called DNA-
DX, which will take a genetic sample from you and use it to create a 
“DNA Portrait” for your living room wall.58  
Leaving home decorating aside, we derive many benefits from shar-
ing our (health) information and allowing our information to be used by 
others. Consider the way Amazon and Netflix can tailor suggestions for 
new purchases personally based upon a customer’s previous selections or 
their friends’ favorites. What these companies are doing with customer 
data behind the scenes looks and smells like research but, for most users 
of the service, the trade-off seems like a good deal. Similar benefits 
accrue to all customers of a pharmacy when information can be compiled 
about drug-drug interactions or genetic mutations that make one person 
more likely than another to respond favorably to a prescription. The 
perks you enjoy while shopping at Amazon can make healthcare safer – 
but only when clinical data are put to good research uses that benefit us 
all. 
V. Future Directions for Research Policy 
In 2011 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
made an attempt to update the regulations with an eye toward address-
ing privacy issues.59 The Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit feedback on proposed changes to the 
Common Rule shone a spotlight on privacy concerns in research by 
suggesting that new, additional protections are warranted to govern the 
use of existing data – even when the information that could identify 
individual subjects has been removed.60 Such a change would represent a 
dramatic departure from the prevailing view that de-identified data and 
specimens pose little or no privacy risk because even highly-stigmatizing 
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information would need to be linked (or reasonably link-able) to the 
subject in order to pose a risk of material harm.  
Unfortunately, the proposed changes would move us in the wrong 
direction. If adopted, they would establish “mandatory standards for 
data security and information protection whenever data are collected, 
generated, stored, or used,” and additional rules protecting against the 
use of de-identified information that is collected or generated as part of a 
research study.61 Specifically, the proposed rule would require written 
consent for the “study of existing data, documents, records and 
biospecimens to include all secondary research use of identifiable data 
and biospecimens that have been collected for purposes other than the 
currently proposed research” and would prohibit un-consented re-use of 
existing de-identified data if they were “originally collected for research 
purposes.”62 
Surely, the people who wrote the ANPRM are well-intentioned. 
They are very concerned about autonomy, which –as explained above –
often is regarded as the most important of the three principles consid-
ered fundamental in human research: Respect for Persons (a.k.a. 
Autonomy), Beneficence, and Justice. 63 But I would suggest that 
privileging autonomy over the principles of justice and beneficence is an 
outdated way of thinking about research ethics and can be harmful. 
Disqualifying the use of de-identified data originally collected for 
research purposes unless subjects are re-consented would be a mistake 
for three reasons. First, it is illogical. How can you obtain consent from 
people when you do not know their identities? Secondly, not using 
existing data would require collection of new data, meaning more people 
than necessary must be studied to answer important questions. This is 
wasteful (an injustice, with regard to the distribution of limited re-
sources) and unnecessarily exposes more people to the risk of harm (a 
violation of beneficence). Finally, it seems to ignore common sense. 
While patients may have no knowledge (outside of the standard HIPAA 
warning) that their data can be used for research, subjects who previous-
ly have consented to participate in research actually know and agreed 
that their data can be used for science (and presumably would be more 
agreeable for further study usage). 
Such a change in paradigm would be a case of over-emphasizing in-
dividual rights at the expense of group wellbeing. EMR data can be used 
to answer important questions if we can agree on the value of infor-
mation altruism. Rather than adding new roadblocks to important 
research that can improve the human condition, we should—as has been 
argued by Hoffman and others –instead think about EMR data as a 
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community asset to be used for the common good.64 This would require a 
shift away from regulations designed to protect us from evildoers and 
toward promotion (with responsible stewardship) of an ethos that values 
information sharing.  
VI. The Case for Progress 
There is a tension between individual liberties –expressed through an 
emphasis on privacy protection –and collective benefits, or progress. 
When we concern ourselves primarily with protection of privacy rights, 
we focus on the individual and the likelihood and magnitude of at least 
two kinds of potential harms. First, material harms, in the context of 
EMR data, could theoretically affect someone’s employability, insurabil-
ity, immigration status, ability to marry, etc. Second, more abstract 
notions of harm, like the dignitary harm (infringement of autonomy) 
could be said to come from unauthorized secondary use of EMR data, 
even when the subject is unaware of it.65 There is also the emotional 
harm that could come from a discovery about which people would rather 
not know. For example, if a particular group of people were found to be 
associated with a dangerous or stigmatizing health condition, that 
information might injure the status of the group and harm an individu-
al’s morale as a member of that group. 
On the other side of the scale, you have scientific progress. As I have 
tried to show, I find the importance of potential benefit here very 
compelling –benefit to individuals who can receive better health care and 
benefit to the larger community of people who can enjoy not only better 
health but also, potentially, more efficient uses of labor, money, and 
other resources. 
Although one could say, on consequentialist grounds, that invading 
the privacy (violating the autonomy) of a few people can be justified if it 
improves the health of many more (other) people, I am not making such 
an argument. Instead, I am saying that we all benefit when we each 
participate. And, because I believe this view is consistent with the three 
fundamental ethical principles of human research protection, I want to 
touch on each and explain why I think they also justify erring on the 
side of progress. 
With regard to Respect for Persons, our paternalistic impulse to pro-
tect actually reduces autonomy in the sense that IRBs and others will 
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actually be forced to reject protocols out of privacy fears when the 
individuals affected may very well have been willing either to consent or 
to allow their data and specimens to have been used without consent. 
There are no provisions under the current regulations for allowing an 
adult of sound mind to say, “Use this information for whatever research 
you please and I’m okay with that.” 
Although it could be argued that harm to individual dignity may be 
created by re-using de-identified data without an individual’s knowledge 
(a violation of the Respect for Persons principle), the principle of 
Beneficence calls for a utilitarian assessment of that risk in the context 
of benefits to subjects and society that could be derived from the 
knowledge to be gained.66 And the principle of Justice suggests a shared 
responsibility to contribute to beneficial knowledge.67 Since the principle 
of Justice in research means equitable distribution of both risks and 
benefits, the situation we have now is unfair. Everyone benefits from 
discoveries made by using data about relatively few people. An ethos of 
information sharing for the common good would be more just. 
The disproportionate protection of privacy in research is not war-
ranted because we already share all sorts of information outside of the 
research environment. Sharing EMR information would benefit everyone 
through new scientific discoveries. By letting fear shape science policy, 
we do more harm than good. Failure to use existing data is an oppor-
tunity cost. Or, put another way, limiting progress reduces beneficence. 
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